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Background: The 2009 pH1N1 influenza pandemic resulted in at least 18,500 deaths worldwide. While pH1N1 is
now considered to be in a post-pandemic stage in humans it has nevertheless spilled back into swine in at least
20 countries. Understanding the factors that increase the risk of spillover events between swine and humans is
essential to predicting and preventing future outbreaks. We assessed risk factors that may have led to spillover of
pH1N1 from humans to swine in Cameroon, Central Africa. We sampled swine, domestic poultry and wild birds for
influenza A virus at twelve sites in Cameroon from December 2009 while the pandemic was ongoing, to August
2012. At the same time we conducted point-count surveys to assess the abundance of domestic livestock and wild
birds and assess interspecific contact rates. Random forest models were used to assess which variables were the
best predictors of influenza in swine.
Results: We found swine with either active pH1N1 infections or positive for influenza A at four of our 12 sites.
Only one swine tested positive by competitive ELISA in 2011-2012. To date we have found pH1N1 only in the
North and Extreme North regions of Cameroon (regions in Cameroon are administrative units similar to provinces),
though half of our sites are in the Central and Western regions. Swine husbandry practices differ between the
North and Extreme North regions where it is common practice in to let swine roam freely, and the Central and
Western regions where swine are typically confined to pens. Random forest analyses revealed that the three best
predictors of the presence of pH1N1 in swine were contact rates between free-ranging swine and domestic ducks,
contact rates between free-ranging swine and wild Columbiformes, and contact rates between humans and ducks.
Sites in which swine were allowed to range freely had closer contact with other species than did sites in which
swine were kept penned.
Conclusions: Results suggest that the practice of allowing swine to roam freely is a significant risk factor for
spillover of influenza from humans into swine populations.Background
The H1N1 2009 influenza pandemic resulted in hun-
dreds of thousands of human cases worldwide [1]. To
date the pandemic has resulted in 18,500 lab-confirmed
deaths [1,2], though estimating the total mortality of
the pandemic may take years. While now in a post-
pandemic period [3], an understanding of the transmis-
sion and spillover dynamics of H1N1 remains essential
for the prediction and prevention of future pandemics.* Correspondence: blarison@ucla.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orPandemic influenza A (pH1N1) is a swine-origin in-
fluenza virus (S-OIV) that may have been circulating
among humans for several months before becoming
pandemic [4]. Swine were not implicated in the spread
of the virus during the pandemic [5], but infected swine
have subsequently been found in 20 countries [6-9] in-
cluding Cameroon [10]. The public health importance of
influenza infections in swine arises from the fact that
swine are susceptible to co-infections with multiple line-
ages of the influenza virus, which can generate novel
strains via reassortment [8,11]. Reassortant viruses con-
taining genes from pH1N1 and other influenza subtypes
have already been isolated from swine in China, the
United States, and the United Kingdom [7,12,13]. As a
consequence there is concern that the next pandemicLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and

















Figure 1 Presence of pH1N1 at twelve sites in Cameroon. Sites
shown by a white point had no positives for any influenza, those
shown by a grey or black point had at least 1 positive for pH1N1. Sites
indicated by grey points had positive sera, while those indicated by
black points had swine shedding the virus at the time of our sampling.
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reassortant virus among humans would require further
adaptation in order to replicate efficiently in humans
and spread between them [14,15].
In August 2009, pH1N1 was first detected in humans
in Cameroon [16]. In February 2010, the prevalence of
pH1N1 was greater than that of seasonal influenza B in
humans in Cameroon; however, by May 2010, influenza
B had the higher prevalence [17]. Nevertheless, pH1N1
continued to persist in humans in Cameroon at low
prevalence as of December 2013 [18]. Cameroon has
lower government expenditure on health than neighbo-
ring nations and a high prevalence of tuberculosis [19],
which is a significant risk factor for respiratory failure
during influenza infection [20]. Therefore an epidemic
of influenza A or a novel reassortant influenza virus
could lead to higher morbidity and mortality than an
outbreak in an upper-middle or upper-income economy
[21]. In addition, Cameroon is an important stopover
and wintering site for migratory birds which may harbor
various strains of influenza A virus [22]. Consequently,
examining the spillover of influenza A among humans,
livestock, and wildlife in Cameroon could provide valua-
ble information on the transmission of the virus with
significant implications elsewhere.
Surveillance of pH1N1 in swine to date has focused on
genotyping the virus in order to characterize in vivo
pathogenicity, and estimate seroprevalence [10,23,24].
However, another important question to be addressed by
surveillance efforts is the extent to which agricultural and
ecological factors contribute to the emergence and persis-
tence of the virus in domestic animals [25]. Currently, the
effects of animal husbandry practices on interspecies
transmission are poorly understood. Models suggest that
swine raised on large-scale commercial farms, where ani-
mals are confined and raised at high densities, could serve
as an important source of novel influenza that might trig-
ger a new pandemic by infecting agricultural workers who
would serve as a bridge to spread the virus to the rest of
the population [26]. Small-scale farms, where swine are
largely free-ranging, are common in many developing
countries [27]. Yet the role of these small swine farms in
facilitating influenza transmission between humans and
swine is largely unknown.
We recently detected the first known cases of pH1N1
infected swine in Cameroon as a result of an ongoing
collaborative effort to understand the ecology and spill-
over dynamics of influenza A [10]. A rationale behind
these efforts was to identify agricultural production sys-
tems and animal husbandry practices that facilitate in-
terspecies transmission of influenza A and to improve
biosecurity policies, with a focus on small-scale, low
investment and subsistence farms. We build on these
findings by assessing how contact rates among speciesmight have influenced the transmission from humans to
swine.
Methods
Between December 2009 and August 2012, we conducted
research at 12 sites in Cameroon to assess prevalence rates
and risk factors for spillover (Figure 1). Three sites were
located in the Central Region, three in West Region, two
in North Region and four in the Extreme North Region
(regions in Cameroon are administrative units similar to
provinces). The sites in northern Cameroon had originally
been selected targeting previous influenza A (H5N1) out-
break areas wherever possible [28]. In addition, the North
and Extreme North Regions of the country are major win-
tering areas for migratory waterfowl, the group possibly
responsible for the spread of H5N1 from Asia to Europe
in 2005 [29,30]. The Central Region comprises the second
most populated region in the country, thus we also viewed
it as critical to our sampling regime. Sites were selected
around the densely populated capital city of Yaoundé be-
cause of the expected high levels of interaction between
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appear to have become endemic in the country because
our surveillance efforts, since the detection of the initial
cases, have not detected H5N1 in wild or domestic birds,
and there have been no further reports of this strain of in-
fluenza in Cameroon. As our study was initiated, however,
pH1N1 was on the rise in humans. We sampled the first
six sites in 2010, adding three in 2011 and three in 2012.
The sites in 2011 and 2012 were selected to broaden the
sampling area and to include regions with both high and
low densities of swine. During each visit we sampled do-
mestic poultry, wild birds, and swine to test for active and
recent influenza infections. Concurrently, we conducted
scan surveys to assess contact rates among humans, do-
mestic animals and wild birds. We screened twice at each
site in 2010, but only use the first set of screens in our
analysis of risk factors as our second visit to these six sites
occurred immediately after a culling event in response to
an outbreak of African swine fever and thus scans were
not representative of typical conditions.
At each location (village compounds and surrounding
farms), we captured and sampled swine, domestic poultry
and wild birds for influenza screening. We sampled 325
swine, collecting both nasal swabs and sera whenever pos-
sible. Cloacal swabs were collected from 582 domestic
poultry (334 chickens, 240 ducks, 4 geese, and 4 turkeys)
and from 1479 wild birds captured using passive mist-
netting along agricultural edges and natural habitats near
villages. We collected sera from 43 ducks, 65 domestic
chickens and 91 wild birds. All the swabs were collected
and processed following standard protocols [31]. Sero-
logical tests were performed according to international
standards [31]. Details of methods used to screen for in-
fluenza can be found in Njabo et al. [10]. Briefly, paired
samples were collected and stored in ethanol and VTM.
For some of the passerines, venous blood was also col-
lected in 20-30 μl aliquots using a 50 μl micropipette and
sterile tip. The first aliquot of blood was added directly to
450 μl of phosphate buffered saline (PBS). Additional ali-
quots of blood were sampled and added to the same
PBS to achieve a final dilution of 1:10 and mixed briefly by
pipetting [32,33]. All the VTM preserved swab samples
were tested at the Centre Pasteur in Cameroon for
presence of influenza A by real time RT-PCR [28].
The VTM samples were also sent to the OIE/FAO lab
in Padova, Italy for confirmation by real time RT-PCR,
culturing and virus genome sequencing. All sera samples
were screened by competitive ELISA type A assay at
the OIE/FAO lab for detection of past exposure to
influenza A. The positive swine sera were then tested for
the following antibodies by Hemagglutination-inhibition
(HI) assays: Eurasian “avian-like” A/Sw/Italy/5766-15/09
(H1N1), triple-reassortant A/Sw/Italy/716/06 (H3N2), and
A/Sw/Italy/4660-3/09 (H1N2) and the human influenzaviruses pH1N1 (A/California/04/2009) and H1N1 (A/Italy/
3983/2009). Sera from birds were also tested by type A
ELISA and all the ELISA positive avian sera were tested by
HI with avian H5, H7 and H9 antigens. Sampling was con-
ducted under UCLA IACUC protocol 2007-001-13A.
Quantifying contact rates is of considerable interest for
assessing risk of transmission and spillover yet standar-
dized methods for quantitative determination of contact
rates are lacking. Studies of wild mammals have used
radio telemetry to produce a measure of how much home
ranges overlap and how often the two animals in question
are found utilizing the area of overlap (Utilization Distri-
bution Overlap Index, UDOI) and used this as a proxy for
observing direct contact. A recent study in raccoons
found UDOI to be a good proxy for direct contact [34].
Assessing the importance of contact rates of wild birds
with livestock and poultry in spillover is a major motiva-
ting feature of our larger study. As radio telemetry was
not feasible for our study we identified a scan sampling
technique used for monitoring abundance of wild birds
[35,36] as a method that should produce a qualitatively
similar measure of overlap as that measured by UDOI and
that could be readily adapted for our study. This tech-
nique is commonly used to assess abundance of wild birds
but has not previously been applied to domestic poultry
and swine, nor has it been used, as far as we know, to as-
sess contact rates. The research that forms the basis for
this study is part of a collaborative study being conducted
in multiple countries with different landscapes and species
[37]. We felt this technique could be successfully adapted
for the collaborative study because it can be easily scaled
to different situations. Scan sampling was conducted in a
stratified fashion by placing points in two human do-
minated land-use categories within each site: 1) within
villages, including inside of family compounds, and 2) sur-
rounding agricultural areas on the edge of the urban/
village matrix. Within these land-use types at each site we
randomly selected 5-10 points at which to conduct scan
sampling. Scans consisted of 50 m diameter plots situated
such that adjacent perimeters were at least 100 m apart.
Fifty meters is a common size plot for this type of scan
[36] and readily fit within the scale of the agricultural or
village locations while being large enough to minimize al-
tering the natural behavior of the animals in the scans. To
make our sampling more representative, each plot was
surveyed 5-10 times between 06:00 and 18:00, and scans
at any one point were conducted at least one hour apart.
To conduct each survey, two observers entered a plot and
silently waited at the center before beginning the count.
After one minute, one observer would begin scanning
while the other recorded. Scans were started by first facing
north, and proceeding in a clockwise direction, coming
full circle over a period of 5-10 minutes depending on en-
vironmental complexity and the number of animals in the
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or domestic animals in the plot were recorded, and for do-
mestic animals, whether they were free-ranging, penned
or caged. We also recorded any human and animal activity
that could be observed in the immediate vicinity of the
plots. Observers were trained to visually estimate the ap-
proximate location of objects in the plots with <10% error
prior to beginning the surveys. Surveys were conducted in
compliance with the Helsinki Declaration under proto-
col #11-000934, approved by the UCLA Institutional
Review Board.
As our surveys resulted in 29 predictor variables,
many of which were highly correlated (Additional file 1:
Figure S1), we analyzed the data using random forest
classification models as implemented in the package ran-
domForest in R [38,39]. We ran 5000 trees within each
random forest run, removing the least important vari-
ables after each run until we identified the “best” model
(“best” was defined as the model with the highest OOB,
or out of bag, variance explained). Unlike standard sta-
tistical models, this modeling approach makes no a
priori assumptions about the relationship between the
response and predictor variables, can make accurate pre-
dictions from ‘wide’ datasets containing more predictors
than observations, and are less susceptible to spatial
autocorrelation [38,40,41]. The basis of the model is a
decision tree, which uses a binary recursive partitioning
procedure to measure the amount of variation in a re-
sponse variable explained by each predictor variable in
the model, splitting the response variable successively by
the variable explaining the majority of the remaining
variance. Random forests use a randomized bootstrap-
ping method in which each tree is constructed using a
randomly selected subset of both the observations and
predictor variables. This bootstrapping provides an in-
trinsic cross-validation which reduces the likelihood of
over-fitting relative to more standard models [38,42].
The error rate of the model is based on the combined
error rate of all the bootstrap iterations when the data
not included in that iteration is predicted using the tree
from the current iteration. Variables are ranked in order
of importance as determined by the reduction in pre-
dictive accuracy of the model when that variable is
permuted randomly. We defined contact as the pairwise
co-occurrence of two individuals of a species pair within
the same 50 m point during the same scan. Thus contact
rates were calculated by multiplying the number of each
species in each scan by the number of each other species
in the scan. Mean contact rates were then calculated for
each species pair for each site. Our predictor variables
were the set of pairwise contact rates that occurred bet-
ween humans and swine (free or penned), swine and
avian species (both wild and domestic), and humans
and avian species. Our response variable was a binaryvariable that reflected whether influenza was detected or
undetected at a site. Because the number of swine we
were able to test for influenza varied among sites we also
included sampling effort among our predictor variables.
As humans were rarely recorded within our plots, and
may have avoided them, we included both humans
within the plots and those observed in the immediate
vicinity in the analyses.
Results
Sampling and screening
Swine tested positive for pH1N1 at four of our 12 sites
(Figure 1). Active cases in which the virus was still present
were detected using real time RT-PCR on the VTM nasal
swabs (GenBank accession numbers JF707781-JF707788)
and were extremely rare; only one swine at each of two
sites tested positive for active infections and only during
early 2010. All swine testing positive in the ELISA assays
were tested by HI with swine flu antigens H1N1, H1N2,
H3N2, and pH1N1 and had HI titers consistent with
pH1N1 (median = 2560, range 160-20480, negative titer =
40). One of these swine also had a titer of 640 (two fold
the negative titer of 80) for H3N2, but this same swine
had a pH1N1 titer of 2560 (6 fold the negative titer of 40
for this strain).
Sera from domestic birds all tested negative by type
A ELISA with five exceptions from chickens (four at
Tindreme and one at Mouda, both in the Extreme North
Region). Four of these sera provided doubtful results in
ELISA. All the ELISA positive yet doubtful avian sera
were tested by HI with avian H5, H7 and H9 antigens.
All gave negative results.
Species abundance and contact rates
A salient difference among sites was whether swine were
kept penned or allowed to range freely. Swine were free
ranging at 5 of the 6 northern sites, but were nearly always
penned in the other sites (Table 1, Figure 1). Domestic
poultry were allowed to range freely at all sampled sites.
Tree classification using the full set of variables resulted in
a single split wherein spillover is predicted to occur at
sites with a human-duck contact rate of 1.3027 or greater.
Random forest classification analyses indicated that the
top three predictors of pH1N1 being present in swine
were contact rates between ducks and free-ranging swine,
contact rates between swine and wild columbiform birds,
and contact rates between humans and ducks (Figure 2).
Seven of the top 10 predictors involved free-ranging swine
(Figure 2, Table 1). The error rate of the full classification
model with all variables was 8.33%. In the full model, sites
in which we did not detect influenza were always correctly
classified, but one of the four sites in which we did detect
influenza was consistently misclassified as a non-influenza
site. A model using only the top three predictors, however,
Table 1 Values of the three most important random forest variables by site
Region Location Number of scans
conducted at site
Mean contact rate between
free swine and ducks
Mean contact rate between free
swine and Columbiformes
Mean contact rate between
humans and ducks
Extreme North Vounaloum 60 4.06 0.70 20.55
Tindreme 92 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maroua 160 0.00 0.00 2.20
Mouda 158 0.14 0.08 13.10
North Malape 75 0.08 0.29 10.08
Gounougou 150 0.49 0.17 3.36
West Mbouo 160 0.00 0.00 0.26
Foumbot 159 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dschang 159 0.00 0.00 0.18
Central Obala 75 0.00 0.00 0.08
Biteng 119 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mefou 74 0.00 0.00 0.41
Bold: sites where influenza was detected.
Humans and weavers
50 15
Mean Decrease in Accuracy
Free-range swine and domestic ducks
Free-range swine and wild Columbiformes
Humans and domestic ducks
Humans and free-range ducks
Free-range swine and domestic chickens
Free-range swine and passerines
Free-range swine and waders
Free-range swine and other land birds
Humans and waders
Humans and wild Columbiformes
Penned swine and weavers
Free-range swine and shorebirds
Penned swine and other land birds
Humans and penned swine
Free-range swine and weavers
Free-range swine and domestic pigeons
Penned swine and domestic ducks
Penned swine and domestic pigeons
Penned swine and wild Columbiformes
Humans and domestic pigeons
Sampling effort (number of swine screened)
Humans and domestic chickens
Humans and domestic geese
Humans and shorebirds
Penned swine and passerines
Penned swine and domestic chickens
Humans and other land birds
Humans and other passerines
Figure 2 Variable importance from random forest analyses. All
variables included in the model are shown listed from top to
bottom in order of importance. Variables are the pairwise contact
rate (as defined in the text) between the two taxa listed. A variable’s
importance is determined by the decrease in the predictive accuracy
of the model when that variable is permuted. Waders include all
water-associated birds excluding Anseriformes and Charadriformes
(shorebirds). Other land birds include all terrestrial birds excluding
Passeriformes, Columbiformes and Galliformes and Village Weavers.
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100% of the time, suggesting that some variables served
only to confound classifications when used as predictors.
Table 2 shows the effect of allowing swine to range freely
on contact with ducks and Columbiformes. In most sites
where swine were penned, swine and these two avian
groups did not co-occur within the same scan, or even
within the same plot at different times. Where swine were
free-ranging they often co-occurred in the same plot
either during the same scan or in the same plot at another
time. Additionally, behavioral notes taken during the scans
by observers included many instances of close contact
between swine and other species, all but one of which
occurred in sites with free-ranging swine. These included
three swine eating a dead duck (Malape), 11 cattle egret
following swine in a marsh area (Gounougou), swine for-
aging in a hut (Vounaloum), and swine sleeping in a hut
with humans (Malape). The only such observation inclu-
ding penned swine was of 7 chickens feeding under an ele-
vated pen with swine in it (Obala).
Discussion
Our results show that animal husbandry practices such
as the manner in which animals are housed may in-
fluence contact rates, and as a consequence, spillover of
influenza. Other studies have found that whether or not
animals are kept separate can influence transmission of
influenza among species [43,44], but these findings are
typically based on qualitative observations and self-
reporting by locals. Our study is unique in providing a
quantitative assessment of the relationship between con-
tact rates and spillover of influenza. Our results suggest
that influenza is more likely to spillover from species to
species when farm animals are allowed to roam freely.
The majority of the important variables for predicting
Table 2 Minimum proximities observed between swine and a) ducks and b) columbiformes at each site
Region Location Swine free-ranging
or penned
Minimum proximity of swine
to domestic ducks (m)
Minimum proximity of swine
to columbiform birds (m)
Extreme North Vounaloum Free-ranging 0.4 1.3
Tindreme Penned . 9.6
Maroua Penned >25 >25
Mouda Free-ranging 4.7 4.3
North Malape Free-ranging 0.0 5.9
Gounougou Free-ranging 1.9 0.2
West Mbouo Penned >25 >25
Foumbot Penned . >25
Dschang Penned >25 .
Central Obala Usually penned 0.8 >25
Biteng Penned >25 >25
Mefou Usually penned >25 24.7
Bold: sites at which influenza was detected. At the sites for which proximity is missing, we observed no Columbiformes or ducks in our scans or elsewhere during
our visit to the site.
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swine and other species, and the data are highly suggestive
that spillover to swine is more likely where swine are free-
ranging. This is because free-ranging swine are likely to
come into closer contact with other species than penned
swine, either directly or through contact with feces or
even dead animals (Table 2). As influenza A can replicate
in the intestines of both birds and mammals (including
humans), one hypothesis is that swine acquired pH1N1 by
consuming human feces containing the virus, though this
awaits confirmation [45-48]. Contact with feces may have
contributed to spillover in the Extreme North Region as
overall hygiene is poor and the people in this region regu-
larly practice open defecation rather than using latrines.
Free-ranging swine were observed eating human feces in
this region. Research shows that lack of education and
resources as well as cultural preferences all impede the
construction and use of sanitary latrines [49,50]. The re-
sults of this study underscore that to reduce disease out-
breaks in this region sanitation and hygiene intervention
must be implemented.
The exact nature of the interspecific transmission routes
is more difficult to discern from our data, for two reasons.
First, contact rates between humans and other species were
not easily quantified. Phylogenetic analysis indicates high
similarity between pH1N1 isolated from Cameroonian
swine and humans, and anecdotal evidence suggests direct
human to swine transmission may be possible. However,
as noted in the methods, humans may have avoided enter-
ing the area of our scans as they were recorded in scans at
only two sites, and then only rarely. Thus to include
humans in the study at all required that we include those
humans observed outside the scans. Second, our data
point to domestic ducks and wild Columbiformes as pos-
sible intermediaries. However the correlations among thetop three most important contact rates revealed by ran-
dom forest analyses are 0.91 (duck-swine and swine-
columbiformes), 0.78 (human-duck and swine-duck) and
0.88 (swine-columbiformes and human-duck), making it
difficult to determine which variable is likely to be causal
and which are merely correlative. We did not detect any
cases of influenza in domestic ducks or Columbiformes,
nor did we encounter any ducks or Columbiformes that
showed signs of disease. However, in some cases, domestic
and wild ducks may support influenza A infections with-
out showing symptoms [51]. Our screening of birds pri-
marily involved real time RT-PCR of cloacal swabs, which
will only detect influenza during the short period of time
when the virus is being shed. Only 43 ducks were screened
by ELISA and we had no sera from Columbiformes.
The regional differences we observed may suggest that
swine in the North and Extreme North were infected
simply because human cases of pH1N1 occurred in this
region and not elsewhere. However, this is unlikely given
the first human case in Cameroon was reported from the
Central Region, and the first apparent case of human-
human transmission occurred in the Central Region
(R. Njouom, personal communication). It has long been
appreciated that geographic differences in influenza preva-
lence among swine may arise in response to ecological fac-
tors [52]. For example, differences in weather conditions
between the North and Central Region might partially
explain the differences in pH1N1 prevalence observed.
During our sampling period, the Harmattan trade wind
blows across northern Cameroon, resulting in a large de-
crease in humidity [53]. Low humidity is one of the main
environmental drivers of influenza transmissibility and
prevalence in laboratory experiments [54]. Dry winds
could create conditions favorable to the persistence of the
virus in dryer areas of northern Cameroon, leading to
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lence that we detected. Such weather differences might also
help explain the complete lack of pH1N1 we found in the
humid Central and West Regions, which the Harmattan
does not reach.
Conclusions
We conclude that free-roaming swine are a significant
risk factor for the spillover and spread of influenza in
Cameroon. The practice of allowing swine to roam free,
often combined with poor hygienic practices, may be an
important factor in spillover of pH1N1 from humans to
swine in northern Cameroon.
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